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INSURANCE-ASSIGNMENT OF POLICY BENEFITS TO
VETERANS' ADMINISTRATION

The United States brought action against an insurance corporation to recover benefits under a contract of insurance assigned
by the insured to the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs. Under
the contract the defendant agreed to pay the insured according
to a schedule of benefits for "expenses actually incurred" because of poliomyelitis. During the policy term the insured was
stricken with this disease, and being a veteran, he applied for
admission to a Veterans' Administration hospital. He was granted
admission upon his execution of an assignment to the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs of all claims for medical expenses
which he might have raised against defendant by virtue of the
insurance contract. Defendant denied any liability under the
assignment. Held: the insured had not actually incurred any
expenses and therefore had no rights under the contract which
could be assigned.1
The instant case is one of first impression and is of widespread importance to the insurance field. Although many problems may arise from such a holding, the intent of the act in
question substantiates the holding, and any corrective measures
to be taken should be effected on a legislative level.
In interpreting the contract,2 the court concluded that the
words "expenses actually incurred" meant that the insured had
to incur a real legal obligation to pay expenses.3 To decide
l United States v. St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co., 133 F. Supp. 726
(D. Neb. 1955).
2 The insurance contract included these provisions:
PART I FOR POLIOMYELITIS Upon receipt of due proof that the
Insured . • . shall have become afflicted with definitely diagnosed
J;>oliomyelitis . . . the Company will pay the Insured the benefits set
forth in Part II of this policy in the amount of the expenses actually
incurred by the Insured for the required treatment received therefore by the Insured. . . .
PART II SCHEDULE OF BENEFITS The benefits payable under this
Policy shall be in accordance with the provisions and limitations of
Part I hereof for expenses actually incurred by the Insured for:
. . . hospital care, medical care. . . .
3 Expenses are not "incurred" during a taxable year, under an Internal
Revenue Act, unless the legal obligation to pay them has arisen. SternSlegman-Prins Co. v. Commissioner, 79 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1935); Bauer
Brothers Co. v. Commissioner, 46 F.2d 874 (6th Cir. 1931); Desco Corp.
v. United States, 55 F.2d 411 (D. Del. 1932). See also for other relations Schmitt v. Emery, 215 Minn. 288, 9 N.W.2d 777 (1943); State v.
Moore, 192 Ore. 39, 233 P.2d 253 (1951).

128

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

whether the insured had such a legal obligation, it is necessary to
examine the statute4 and to determine the validity of the administrative regulation requiring the assignment. 5
The statute has two parts, enacted at different times. 6 The
language and legislative history7 indicate that it was the intent of
Congress to make that part of the statute following the word
"provided" mandatory, so as to give hospital treatment to any
veteran: (1) not dishonorably discharged, (2) in need of hos4 48 Stat. 9 (1933), as amended, 38 U.S.C. § 706 (1952).
"In addition
to the pensions provided in this chapter the .Administrator of Veterans'
.Affairs is authorized under such limitations as he may prescribe, and
within the limits of existing Veterans' .Administration facilities, to furnish
to men discharged from the .Army, . . . for disabilities incurred in the
line of duty or to those in receipt of pension for service-connected disability, and to veterans of any war, . . . domiciliary care where they are
suffering with permanent disabilities, . . . and medical and hospital treatment for diseases or injuries: Provided, That any veteran of any war
who was not dishonorably discharged, suffering from disability, disease or
defect, who is in need of hospitalization or domiciliary care and is unable
to defray the necessary expenses therefor . . . shall be furnished necessary
hospitalization . . . in any Veterans' .Administration facility, within the
limitations existing in such facilities, irrespective of whether the disability,
disease, or defect was due to service. . . . "
ti 38 C.F.R. § 17.48(d) (Supp. Jan. 1, 1955).
"(d) Persons hospitalized . . . who it is believed may be entitled to hospital care or medical or
surgical treatment or to reimbursement for all or part of the cost thereof, by reason of statutory, contractual, or other relationships with third
parties, including those liable for damages by reason of negligence or
other legal wrong, will not be furnished hospital treatment without charge
therefor to the extent of the amount for which third parties are or will
become liable, and such patients will be requested to execute appropriate
assignment or other instrument which will entitle the .Administrator . . .
to receive and to collect, directly or as assignee, from the third party or
parties, to the extent of the amounts for which such third party is liable,
the cost of such care and treatment as determined under the applicable
rules and regulations, including medical fee schedules, of the Veterans
.Administration. The words 'by reason of statutory or contractual relationship' as used in this paragraph include, but are not limited to (1) membership in a union, fraternal or other organization, ( 2) rights under a group
hospitalization plan, or under any insurance contract or plan which provides for payment or reimbursement for the cost of medical or hospital
care, and conditions the obligation of the insurer to pay upon payment
or incurrence of liability by the person covered, ( 3) 'workmen's compensation' or 'employers' liability' statutes, State or Federal, ( 4) right to 'maintenance and cure' in admirality."
6 The part of the statute, quoted supra note 4, which precedes the word
"Provided" was enacted as section 6 of the .Act of March 20, 1933, 48
Stat. 9 (1933), with amendment by the .Act of June 16, 1933, 48 Stat.
301 (1933). The part following the word "Provided" was added by
amendment in the .Act of March 28, 1934, 48 Stat. 525 (1934).
178 Cong. Rec. 3288 (1934).
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pitalization, and (3) unable to defray necessary expenses. 8 This
part of the statute makes imperative the allowance of hospitalization, and the Veterans' Administration is without authority to
devitalize that right of a veteran, or to condition its enjoyment
by regulation. The court found that the language authorizing the
Administrator of Veterans' Affairs to furnish discharged veterans hospital treatment, "under such limitations as he may prescribe,"9 applies only to that part of the statute preceding the
word "provided" and does not limit the mandatory character of
the remaining portion of the statute.
The plaintiff pressed upon the court two other sections of the
act regarding the authority of the Administrator10 and argued
that regulations promulgated by the Administrator within the
authority of the statute have the effect of law. 11 But the court
found that these two sections deal with administrative decisions
upon claims for benefits within the bestowal of the Veterans'
Administration, not with the exercise of such administrative authority as is involved in the promulgation of regulations or in
the making of interpretative rulings. The regulation12 was held
not to be within the authority of the administrator.
Since the insured received essentially charitable benefits in
the veterans' hospital and did not actually incur e}>.-penses, the
assignment represented an unmatured claim under the policy;
and the plaintiff acquired no greater rights than the insured.
s Note that 48 Stat. 525 (1934), 38 U.S.C. § 706 (1952) also provides:
"The statement under oath of the applicant on such form as may be
prescribed by the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs shall be accepted as
sufficient evidence of inability to defray necessary expenses."
9 48 Stat. 9 (1933), 38 U.S.C. § 706 (1952).
10 48 Stat. 9 (1933), as amended, 38 U.S.C. § 705 (1952).
"All decisions rendered by the Administrator . . . under the provisions of sections . . . 706, . . . of this title or the regulations issued pursuant thereto,
shall be final and conclusive on all questions of law and fact, and no . . .
court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to review . . . any such
decision."
54 Stat. 1197 (1940), 38 U.S.C. § lla-2 (1952). "Notwithstanding
any other provisions of law, except as provided in sections 445 and 817
of this title, the decisions of the Administrator . . . on any question of
law or fact concerning a claim for benefits or payments under any Act
administered by the Veterans' Administration shall be final and conclusive and no . . . court of the United States shall have power or jurisdiction to review any such decision."
11 Helliwell v. Haberman, 140 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1944); Bernick v_
Coddon, 65 F. Supp. 89 (D. Minn. 1946); Stanger v. Glenn L. Martin.
Co., 56 F. Supp. 163 (D. Md. 1944).
12 See note 5 supra.

1:30

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

The administrative regulation, which the court refused to
enforce, required assignment of hospital and medical benefits to
which the veteran might become entitled "by reason of statutory, contractual, or other relationships with third parties, including those liable for damages by reason of negligence or other
legal wrong." This decision may affect not only the insurance
industry,13 but also veterans who are receiving hospital benefits
under this federal statute. Since the furnishing of hospital care
to qualified veterans14 is mandatory, the effect of the decision is
that in many cases the veteran will be able to receive hospital and
medical care under the statute and also be reimbursed by a third
party.16 In view of the positive language of the act, the problem
of whether the taxpayer should give the veteran a double recovery
in this situation is not for the courts, but for Congress.
Hal W. Bauer, '56

13 Other insurance contracts also agree to pay the insured for hospital
and medical "expenses actually incurred." These are so-called "indemnity"
contracts. See the Medical Payments provision of the National Standard
Automobile policy which agrees "to pay all reasonable expenses incurred. . . . "
14 The requirement that the veteran be "unable to defray the necessary
expenses" of hospital care seems to have no enforceable standard. See
note 8 supra.
tG ( 1) A veteran receiving hospital and medical care under the federal
statute may also receive benefits under Nebraska's workmen's compensation law.
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-120 (Reissue 1948): "The employer shall be
liable for reasonable medical and hospital services and medicines as and
when needed . . • . " Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-130 (Reissue 1948) provides:
No savings or insurance of the injured employee . . . independent
of this act shall be taken into consideration in determining the
compensation to be paid thereunder; nor shall benefits derived
from any other source . . . be considered in fixing compensation
under this act.
(2) Many insurance contracts do not contain the condition precedent
of "actually incurring expenses," and the veteran would have a right to
collect under this type of contract whether or not he incurred a legal
obligation to pay hospital and medical expenses. These are so-called
"valued policy" contracts. The personal accident policy which pays a
specified amount for a certain type of injury is an example.
(3) The veteran may have a cause of action in a negligence suit
against a third party.

